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Abstract
It is not straightforward to define the ethics of responsibility in
cases where the consequences of changes in factors within our
control are partly determined by factors beyond our control. In this
paper, we suggest that one plausible view is to keep us
responsible for the parts of the consequences that are
independent of the factors beyond our control. Within the
framework of a first best taxation problem, we present and
characterise a redistributive mechanism that both satisfies this
interpretation of the ethics of responsibility and the ethics of
compensation within a broad class of economic environments.
However, on a general basis, even this weaker version of the
ethics of responsibility is not compatible with the ethics of
compensation, and we report an impossibility result that clarifies
the source of this conflict.
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The ethics of responsibility, saying that society should not indemnify people against
outcomes that are consequences of causes that are within their control (Roemer
(1993, p. 147)), has been assigned a prominent part in recent egalitarian reasoning.1
However, as is by now well-known, this idea is not easily combined with the other
main aspect of egalitarian reasoning, to wit the ethics of compensation, which states
that society should eliminate inequalities due to factors that are beyond the control
of people. In a remarkable series of papers, it has been argued that the ethics of
responsibility and the ethics of compensation are not compatible on a general basis,
and hence that we often have to make trade-o¤s between these two principles in the
design of egalitarian institutions.2
I will suggest a slightly di¤erent picture of this problem. In my view, the basic
problem is not how to make trade-o¤s between the ethics of compensation and
the ethics of responsibility in certain cases, but rather how to de…ne the ethics of
responsibility on a general basis. There are competing plausible interpretations of
the ethics of responsibility, and not all of them are as incompatible with the ethics
of compensation as suggested by the present literature. In particular, as I show in
this paper, there exists one interpretation of the ethics of responsibility that can be
reconciled with the ethics of compensation in a rather general framework. According
to this interpretation, the agents should be responsible for the consequences that
are independent of factors beyond their control, but not necssarily for all of the
consequences following a change in the factors within their control. However, on a
general basis, even this weaker version of the ethics of responsibility is not compatible
with the ethics of compensation, and we report an impossibility result that clari…es
the source of this con‡ict.
The arguments will be illustrated in the context of …rst best taxation, where
we assume that e¤ort and talent determine the pre-tax income of individuals. Only
e¤ort can be controlled by the individual, and thus our purpose will be to establish
1For critical reviews of parts of this literature, see Fleurbaey (1995a) and Anderson (1999).
Notice that the concept of responsibility does not have to be assigned to an agent on the basis of
control, but can also be assigned on the basis of delegation (see Fleurbaey (1995a,b). In this paper,
we refer to control as the basis of responsibility, but the arguments could as well be reformulated
within a framework where we have responsibility by delegation.
2See Bossert (1995), Fleurbaey (1994, 1995b, 1995c),and Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996).
2a redistributive mechanism that eliminates the e¤ects of talent (the ethics of com-
pensation) but not of e¤ort (the ethics of responsibility). In Section 2, we outline
the standard view of the literature on this problem, whereas in Section 3 we suggest
a somewhat di¤erent approach to the ethics of responsibility. On the basis of this
discussion, we suggest a condition that (in our view) any reasonable interpretation
of the ethics of responsibility should satisfy, and in Section 4 we prove that this
condition contributes to a characterisation of a particular redistributive mechanism
in a broad class of economic environments. This redistributive mechanism assigns
to each agent a transfer that equals the part of the consequences of his choice of
e¤ort which is independent of talent and moreover a uniform transfer which re‡ects
that everyone has a right to an equal share of the amount of resources produced by
the common pool of talent. Within a broad class of economic environments, the out-
lined redistributive mechanism is closely related to the class of egalitarian-equivalent
mechanisms considered by Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996). In fact, in these cases it
supports the same post-tax income distribution as the egalitarian-equivalent mecha-
nism de…ned by the talent of the agent that has the lowest marginal productivity of
e¤ort. However, on a more general basis, the suggested mechanism violates the mini-
mal condition imposed on the ethics of responsibility, and in Section 4 we prove that
this is also the case for any other mechanism satisfying the ethics of compensation.
In Section 5, we outline an alternative defence of the suggested mechanism.
Section 6 contains concluding remarks.
2 The problem
It turns out that even if we agree on how to make a distinction between relevant
and irrelevant factors, it is not straightforward to design a redistributive scheme
that satis…es both the ethics of responsibility and the ethics of compensation. This
is well-known, but it will be instructive for the rest of the discussion to illustrate
the problem in a very simple two-person case.
Assume we have one talented person and one person with low talent, who can







Figure 1. Pre-tax income (situation A)
Our aim is now to design a redistributive scheme that compensates for di¤erences
in talent but not for di¤erences in e¤ort. In doing this, we assume that there are no
e¢ciency losses from taxation.
The redistributive scheme has to cover four cases, as presented in Figure 2.
Low Talent
High Talent
High E¤ort Low E¤ort
High E¤ort Case 1 Case 2
Low E¤ort Case 3 Case 4
Figure 2. The relevant cases
Let us …rst look at Case 1 and Case 4, where both persons exercise the same
amount of e¤ort and hence only di¤er in talent. By the ethics of compensation, talent
is an irrelevant factor that cannot justify any inequalities. Thus, in these cases, the
redistributive scheme must assign the same amount of income to the two persons.
This is the principle of full compensation (Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996, p. 346)).
Equal Income for Equal E¤ort: If two persons exercise the same e¤ort, then they
receive the same post-tax income.
To evaluate Case 2 and Case 3, where people exercise di¤erent levels of e¤ort, it
is instructive to compare these cases to Case 4. The only di¤erence between Case 2
(Case 3) and Case 4 is that the more talented (less talented) exercise more e¤ort,
and hence it has been argued that according to the ethics of responsibility the agent
should bear the consequences.
“The ethics of responsibility usually conveys the idea that society
(or the so-called ‘social planner’) should let the agents exercise their
responsibility and bear the consequences of such exercise, without try-
ing to distort their outcomes in a particular way and with particular
incentives” (Fleurbaey (1995d, p. 685).
4This is the principle of no compensation (Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996, p. 349).
Individual Monotonicity in E¤ort: A change in total pre-tax income due to a change
in one agent’s e¤ort only a¤ects this person’s post-tax income.




High E¤ort Low E¤ort
High E¤ort 90,90 90,10
Low E¤ort 10,90 10,10
Figure 3. The redistributive scheme (situation A)
In this situation, there is no con‡ict between the two suggested principles, and the
redistributive scheme guarantees both persons equal opportunities (see Fleurbaey
(1995a), Bossert (1995), and Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996))
This harmony is due to the fact the gain in pre-tax income following an increase
in e¤ort is independent of talent. Otherwise, the two principles of no compensation
and full compensation are not compatible. In our simple two-person example, we







Figure 4. Pre-tax income (situation B)
In this case, if we apply the principle of full compensation on Case 4 and then
the principle of no compensation when moving from Case 4 to Case 3 and from Case
3 to Case 1, we get the following redistributive scheme.
Low Talent
High Talent
High E¤ort Low E¤ort
High E¤ort 90,80
Low E¤ort 10,80 10,10
Figure 5. Redistributive scheme 1 (situation B)
5As is easily seen, the redistributive scheme in Figure 5 violates the principle of
full compensation in Case 1. Hence, we have a problem.
3 The Ethics of Responsibility
In the context of an additively separable pre-tax income function, the principle of
Individual Monotonicity in E¤ort seems to be an indisputable part of the ethics of
responsibility. The change in pre-tax income caused by a change in e¤ort is inde-
pendent of talent, and hence completely within the control of the agent. However,
the situation is more problematic when we lack additive separability. On the ba-
sis of control, a talented person can be held responsible for exercising high e¤ort,
but not for being a talented person exercising high e¤ort. Hence, from the ethics of
responsibility, it follows that the talented person should bear the consequences of
exercising high e¤ort per se, but not necessarily that it should bear the consequences
of exersising high e¤ort as a talented person.
But what are the consequences of exercising high e¤ort per se? Obviously, in the
face of non-separability, there is no clear answer to this question. In order to make
the ethics of responsibility operational, however we need a standard for measuring
these consequences. One possibility is of course to follow the framework underlying
Individual Monotonicity in E¤ort, where people are responsible for all of the con-
sequences that follow from an increase in e¤ort. However, in our view, an equally
plausible approach is to keep people responsible for the consequences of changed
e¤ort that would take place independent of their talent. If two persons exercise the
same increase in e¤ort, then any di¤erence in consequences is due to talent. These
di¤erences are beyond their control, and hence it can be argued that they should
not be considered part of the ethics of responsibility.
Notice that this is not to mix the ethics of responsibility with the ethics of com-
pensation. The outlined argumhis e¤ort. As a consequence, he gains 70 in pre-tax income. Independent of talent,
an increase in e¤ort would imply at least a gain of this size, and hence it seems
indisputable to let the person be responsible for this change. On the other hand,
when we move from Case 3 to Case 1, the more talented person increases his e¤ort
and by that gains 80 in pre-tax income. In this case, it can be argued that to keep
the person responsible for all of this is to overlook the fact that he gains so much
because he is more talented. If the more talented was the less talented, he would
gain 70, and the more talented cannot be held responsible for the fact that he or
she is more talented. Consequently, it can be argued that all that follows from the
the ethics of responsibility in this case is that the more talented keeps 70. Whether
or not he should keep the remaining 10 as well becomes an issue of compensation.
However, a violation of Individual Monotonicity in E¤ort may imply that equally
talented people pay di¤erent amounts of taxes (or receive di¤erent subsidies). Hence,
it may violate the following version of the ethics of responsibility (see Bossert and
Fleurbaey (1996, p. 348)):
Equal Transfer for Equal Talent: Equally talented people should pay the same
amount of tax (or receive the same subsidy).
Some may …nd this troublesome, arguing that in these cases the implications
of the ethics of responsibility should be obvious. The only di¤erence between two
talented people would be the di¤erence in e¤ort they exercise, and hence it seems
hard to deny that it follows from the ethics of responsibility that they should bear
the consequences of any di¤erences in this respect. But the same argument applies
again. Look at the case with two talented persons, one exercising high e¤ort and
the other exercising low e¤ort. Both persons can be held responsible for their e¤ort
levels, but none of them can be held responsible for the fact that they are talented
persons. Hence, it follows from the ethics of responsibility that we should hold them
responsible for any consequences following from di¤erences in e¤ort levels, but not
necessarily for all of the consequences following from the fact that these di¤erences
in e¤ort levels take place in the context of talented persons. Consequently, given
this interpretations of the ethics of responsibility, we may allow for di¤erences in
tax levels among equally talented persons.
In sum, I suggest that it is far from obvious how to de…ne the ethics of respon-
sibility in the context of a non-separable pre-tax income function. However, I will
argue that some restrictions can be placed on the set of plausible de…nitions. First,
7any plausible view of the ethics of responsibility should at least hold the agents
responsible for the actual consequences that are independent of talent. Second, the
agents should not be held responsible for more than the actual consequences fol-
lowing an increase in e¤ort. In my view, these restrictions follow naturally from our
understanding of the idea of being responsible for something. At the one hand, it
seems unreasonable to be held responsible for more than what you have caused by
your choices (the second restriction); at the other hand, if the consequences of your
choices are partly beyond your control, then it seems reasonable to restrict your
responsibility (the …rst restriction).
The two restrictions allow for a very broad view on the ethics of responsibility,
including the position represented by Individual Monotonicity in E¤ort. However,
in the next section, I will prove that in combination with the ethics of compensation
this framework supports a particular redistributive mechanism.
4 Analysis
Consider a society with a population N = f1;:::;ng, n > 4, where agent i’s e¤ort
is ei and his talent ti. We assume that ei;ti 2 <, where < is the set of real num-
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), - µ <2 the set of all possible characteristics vectors (where
-E is the set of all possible e¤ort levels and -T the set of all possible talents), and
-n µ <2n the set of all possible characteristics pro…les. Let ~ -n ½ -n be the set of
admissible characteristics pro…les, where for any a;~ a 2 ~ -n, aT = ~ aT. In other words,
we do not consider interpro…le conditions with respect to talent,4 but assume that
there is a single charcteristics pro…le of talent in society. This pro…le, however, can
be any pro…le within the set of possible pro…les. We impose no other restrictions on
the set of permissible characteristics vectors and pro…les.
The income function f : - ! < is assumed to be strictly increasing in both
arguments. The income function is additively separable if and only if there exist
functions g : -E ! < and h : -T ! < such that f(e;t) = g(e) + h(t), 8e;t 2
3Hence, we do not consider the multidimensional version of this problem: see Bossert and
Fleurbaey (1996).
4See Bossert (1995)
8<. Moreover, de…ne minaE = min(aE
1 ;:::;aE
n) and for any e1;e2 2 <;where e2 ¸









i=1f(ai), 8a 2 ~ -n.
At the outset, let us have a look at the following redistributive mechanism, which
is only well-de…ned if we have additive separability in the pre-tax income function.
F 0
k(a) = g(aE




i ), 8a 2 ~ -n, 8k 2 N:
Bossert (1995) shows that F0 is the only mechanism that satis…es the following
two conditions.
Equal Income for Equal E¤ort (EINEE): 8a 2 ~ -n; 8i;j 2 N; aE
i = aE
j ! Fi(a) =
Fj(a):
Individual Monotonicity (IM): 8a;~ a 2 ~ -n; 8k 2 N; aE
j = ~ aE
j ; 8j 6= k ! Fj(a) =
Fj(~ a):
Hence, unless f is additively separable, we have an impossibility result.
Theorem 1 An e¢cient redistribution mechanism F satis…es EINEE and IM if
and only if f is additively separable, and F = F 0:
Proof. See Bossert (1995) and Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996).
When presenting this result, Bossert remarks that: “For income functions f that
are additively separable,..., F0 seems very plausible. If the e¤ects of relevant and
irrelevant characteristics on income can be separated, it seems only natural to assign
the entire income portion due to relevant characteristics to each agent, and divide
the total income due to irrelevant characteristics equally among agents” (Bossert
(1995, p. 4)).”
However, notice that the fact that we know that f is additively separable does
not necessarily imply that we can separate all of the e¤ects of relevant and irrelevant






9Figure 6. Pre-tax income (situation C)
In Situation C, the pre-tax income function is additively separable. But how
should we separate the e¤ects of e¤ort and talent on income? Should we choose








Figure 7. Alternative ways of separating the e¤ects of e¤ort
and talent on income (Situation C).
Alternative A assigns almost all of the e¤ects to e¤ort, whereas the opposite is
the case in Alternative B. What is correct? It does not necessarily follow any answer
from the fact that the pre-tax income function is additively separable, because both
separations provide a representation of f. More importantly, for the purpose of
choosing a redistributive mechanism, it really does not matter in the context of F0.
In both cases, we end up with the the same post-tax distribution of income.
Remark 1 For any additively separable income function f(e;t) = g¤(e) + h¤(t),
where g¤(e) = g(e) + ² and h¤(t) = h(t) ¡ ², ² 2 <, F 0 is invariant to the choice of
²:
The proof is trivial (and hence omitted). But still the observation is of some
interest, because it highlights the representational nature of F0: The appealing re-
distributive mechanism satisfying EINEE and IM can always be represented by F0,
but that does not imply that the numbers assigned to the e¤ects of talent and e¤ort
in F0 should be given complete substantive interpretation. What matters is that
the consequences of any di¤erence in e¤ort are independent of talent, which will be
re‡ected for every possible choice of g and h :
When facing an additive separable pre-tax income function, we would get the
same distribution of resources by applying the following e¢cient redistributive
scheme.
F MIN
k (a) := min¢(aT;aE





8a 2 ~ -n, 8k 2 N,
10This redistribution function consists of two parts: the …rst part dealing with the
ethics of responsibility and the second part with the ethics of compensation. Every
agent receives a transfer which equals the part of the consequences of his choice of
e¤ort that is independent of talent and, moreover, a uniform transfer which re‡ects
that everyone has a right to an equal share of the amount of resources produced by
the common pool of talent.
We will now look at di¤erent ways of characterising this redistributive mecha-
nism. First, we introduce the restriction on the ethics of responsibility that it should
never give a compensation smaller than the consequences that are independent of
talent or larger than the actual increase in pre-tax income of the agent in question.
Restricted Compensation (RC): For any j 2 N and a;~ a 2 ~ -n, where ~ aE
j > aE
j
and ai = ~ ai, 8i 6= j; f(~ aj) - f(aj) ¸ Fj(~ a) - Fj(a) ¸ min¢(aT;~ aE
j ;aE
j ):
In the formal analysis, a much weaker version of RC is su¢cient.
Weakly Restricted Compensation (WRC): For any j 2 N and a;~ a 2 ~ -n, where
~ aE
j > aE
j and ai = ~ ai, 8i 6= j; f(~ aj) - f(aj) = min¢(aT;~ aE
j ;aE




When studying the implications of WRC, we need to introduce the following
restriction on the income function f: We will say that f is regular if and only if
for any t1;t2 2 < and any e1,e2,e3 2 <, where e3 > e2 > e1, f(t1;e2) - f(t1;e1)
> f(t2;e2) - f(t2;e1) ! f(t1;e3) - f(t1;e2) ¸ f(t2;e3) - f(t2;e2):5 In many cases,
this condition should be considered acceptable. By way of illustration, it is common
to assume (for example in labour markets) that the marginal productivity of the
more talented is higher than of the less talented for every e¤ort level. However, the
regularity condition does not rule out the opposite case. What it rules out is that
there is a change in the ranking of marginal productivity at a certain e¤ort level.
In any case, the regularity condition is needed in order to avoid an impossibility
result for the framework of EINEE and RC.
Theorem 2 A redistribution mechanism F satis…es EINEE and WRC if and only
if f is regular and F=FMIN:
5Of course, additive separability implies that f is regular. But there is no equivalence. There
are many non-separable pre-tax income functions that are regular.
11Proof. (1) We will …rst prove that there does not exist any F satisfying EINEE
and WRC if f is not regular. In this case, there exist t1;t2 2 < and e1;e2;e3 2 <
such that f(t1;e2) - f (t1;e1) > f(t2;e2) - f(t2;e1) and f(t1;e3) - f (t1;e2) < f(t2;e3)
- f(t2;e2):
(2) Suppose f(t1;e3) - f(t1;e1) ¸ f(t2;e3) - f (t2;e1). In this case, consider a 2
~ -n, where for some k 2 N, aT
k = t2, aT
i = t1, 8i 6= k, and aE
i = e2, 8i 2 N. By
EINEE, Fi(a) = Fk(a), 8i 2 N: Consider ~ a 2 ~ -n, where for some j 2 N; ~ aE
j = e3 and
~ ai = ai, 8i 6= j. By the assumption in (1), f(~ aj) - f(aj) = min¢(aT;e3;e2): Hence,
by WRC, Fj(~ a) - Fj(a) = f(~ aj) - f(aj). Consider now
t




k = e1 and
t
ai=
~ ai, 8i 6= k. By the assumption in (1), f(~ ak) - f(
t
ak) = min¢(aT;e2;e1): Hence, by
WRC, Fk(~ a) - Fk(
t







+ min¢(aT;e3;e2). Finally, consider
u








ai, 8i 6= j. By




















a) + min¢(aT;e2;e1) + min¢(aT;e3;e2) <
Fk(
u
a). However, this violates EINEE, and hence the supposition in the …rst sentence
of (2) is not possible.
(3) Suppose f(t1;e3) - f(t1;e1) < f(t2;e3) - f (t2;e1). By the same line of reason-
ing as in (2), we can show that this supposition is not possible. The only di¤erence
is that we in this case consider a
u








ai, 8i 6= j. Hence,
if f is not regular, then there does not exist an F satisfying EINEE and WRC.
(4) We will now prove that if f is regular and F satis…es EINEE and WRC, then
F = F MIN; i.e. for any a 2 ~ -n, Fi(a) = FMIN
i (a), 8i 2 N. In this case, the fact
that f is regular implies that there exists an l 2 N such that for any e1;e2 2 <,
where e2 > e1; f(aT
l ;e2) - f(aT
l ;e1) = min¢(aT;e2;e1). Now consider ~ a 2 ~ -n, where
~ aE
l = minaE and ~ ai = ai, 8i 6= l. By WRC and the fact that f is regular, we have
that Fl(a) - Fl(~ a) = min¢(aT;al;min~ aE) = f(al) - f(~ al) and Fi(~ a) = Fi(a), 8i 6= l.







l = ~ ak and
t
ai = ~ ai, 8i 6= l. By RC and the fact that f is
regular, Fl(
t
a) = Fl(~ a) + min¢(aT;~ al;min~ aR = ~ al) and Fi(
t
a) = Fi(~ a), 8i 6= l. But





which violates EINEE. Hence, the supposition cannot be correct.
(6) By (5) it follows that Fi(~ a) - Fl(~ a) = min¢(aT;~ ai;min~ aE = ~ al), 8i 2 N. F









min¢(aT;~ ai;min~ aE = ~ al)]. If we take into account that min¢(aT;~ al;min~ aE = ~ al)
=0 and reorganize, we …nd that Fl(~ a) = 1
n
Pn
i=1[f(~ ai) - min¢(aT;~ ai;min~ aE)]: More-
over, we know from (4) that f(~ al) = f(al) - min¢(aT;al;minaE), f(ai) = f(~ ai),




Consequently, taking into account that Fi(~ a) = Fi(a); 8i 6= l (from (4)), we …nd
that Fi(a) = min¢(aT;ai;minaE) + 1
n
Pn
i=1[f(ai) - min¢(aT;ai;minaE)]: More-
over, from (4) it follows that Fl(a) - Fl(~ a) = min¢(aT;~ al;min~ aE), and then this





(7) It is easily seen that FMIN satis…es EINEE. If f is regular, it also follows
straightforwardly that F MIN satis…es WRC (and RC).
Hence, if we accept RC (or WRC) as a minimal condition on the ethics of re-
sponsibility, we either face an impossibility result or a characterisation result. If f is
not regular, then there does not exist any plausible version of the ethics of respon-
sibility that is compatible with the ethics of compensation. However, in all cases
where f is regular, we have a unique redistributive mechanism that both satis…es
the ethics of compensation and a plausible version of the ethics of responsibility.
In fact, the mechanism characterised in Theorem 2 is closely related to a member
of the class of egalitarian-equivalent mechanisms considered by Bossert and Fleur-
baey (1996).6 This class can be de…ned as follows:
F EE
k (a) := f(^ aT;aE




k )), 8a 2 ~ -n, 8k 2 N,
where ^ aT is de…ned as the reference talent. As remarked by Bossert and Fleurbaey
(1996, p. 344), “the choice of a particular reference vector is an important issue”.
They do not attempt to solve this problem, but suggests a mechanism that can be
applied once this decision has been made. In this respect, our result supplements
their analysis, because Theorem 2 provides a characterisation of a mechanism that
is equivalent to a member of this class when f is regular.7
Remark 2 F MIN supports the same post-tax income distribution as the egalitarian-
equivalent mechanism de…ned by the reference talent to the agent who has the lowest
6See also Fleurbaey (1995).
7See also Sprumont (1997).
13marginal productivity of e¤ort (though not necessarily the least talented in the pro…le)
if and only if f is regular.
Proof. The only-if part is trivial. If f is regular, then there exists an l 2 N such that
for any e1;e2 2 <, where e2 > e1; f(aT
l ;e2) - f(aT
l ;e1) = min¢(aT;e2;e1). In this
case, as is easily seen, F MIN equals the member of the class of egalitarian-equivalent
mechanisms with aT
l as the reference talent.
It can be instructive to compare Theorem 2 with the characterisation of
egalitarian-equivalent mechanisms in Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996, Theorem 1).
First, Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) work within a more general framework that
allows for multi-dimensional characteristics of talent and e¤ort, whereas we assume
(as Sprumont (1997)) that talent and e¤ort are real variables. Second, Bossert and
Fleurbaey (1996) rely on an interpro…le version of the ethics of compensation (with
respect to talent), contrary to our single pro…le framework. Third, they do not im-
pose any restrictions on f. In particular, they do not demand that f is regular.
Finally, they impose a less speci…c version of the ethics of responsibility, which de-
mands no transfers between agents if everyone has the same level of talent (equal to
the reference talent). This is also implied by RC, which in addition imposes restric-
tions on the ethics of responsibility in cases where the agents’ talent di¤er. In sum,
roughly speaking Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) provide a very general interpro…le
characterisation of the class of egalitarian-equivalent mechanisms, whereas we attain
a single pro…le characterisation of a mechanism equivalent to a particular member
of this class by adding some restrictions on the pre-tax income function and on the
ethics of responsibility.
5 An Alternative Characterisation
We will now suggest an alternative characterisation of FMIN: For this purpose, we
impose a restriction on how an increase in e¤ort by some agent should in‡uence
other agents post-tax income.
No Negative E¤ect on Others (NNEO): For any j 2 N and a;~ a 2 ~ -n, where
~ aE
j > aE
j and ai = ~ ai, 8i 6= j, Fi(~ a) ¸ Fi(a); 8i 2 N:
There is a close relationship between NNEO and RC. If NNEO is satis…ed,
then it follows that no one will receive a larger increase in post-tax income than
14the actual increase in pre-tax income following an increase in e¤ort (which also is
implied by RC). However, in one respect, NNEO is stronger than RC, because it
imposes restrictions on how an increase in e¤ort by some agent should in‡uence
other agents post-tax income. On the other hand, NNEO does not place any other
restrictions on the set of admissible schemes of compensation. In particular, it does
not demand that the agent receives at least the increase in pre-tax income that is
independent of talent, and hence in this respect it is weaker than RC.
Also in the case of NNEO, we have to impose restrictions on f in order to
establish a link to F MIN:
Remark 3 FMIN satis…es NNEO if and only if f is regular.
Proof. The if part of the remark is trivial, and hence we will only prove the only-if
part.
(1) If f is not regular, then there exist t1;t2 2 < and e1;e2;e3 2 < such that







, where for some k 2 N, ak = ft1;e2g,
s
ak = ft1;e3g,











i=1f(^ ai) ¡ min¢(aT;e3;e1)
¤
, 8i 6= k, which violates NNEO.
However, EINEE and NNEO does not characterise F MIN when f is regular.
By way of illustration, the e¢cient and strictly egalitarian redistributive mechanism
assigning an equal amount of the resources to each individual in all cases satis…es
both conditions. But this condition is completely insensitive to di¤erences in e¤ort,
and hence of no interest for our purpose. Thus, the interesting question is whether
there exists any other mechanism satisfying both EINEE and NNEO that is more
sensitive to di¤erences in e¤ort than F MIN :
In order to answer this question, we have to clarify what it means that F is more
sensitive to di¤erences in e¤ort than F 1. At the outset, two alternative de…nitions
might be considered.
De…nition 1 F is more sensitive to di¤erences in e¤ort than F 1 i¤ for any a 2 ~ -n
and j;k 2 N, where aE
j > aE
k , Fj(a) - Fk(a) ¸ F 1
j (a) - F 1
k(a) and there exist ~ a 2 ~ -n,
l;m 2 N where ~ aE
l > ~ aE
m and Fl(~ a) - Fm(~ a) > F 1
l (a) - F 1
m(a):
15De…nition 2 F is more sensitive to di¤erences in e¤ort than F1 i¤ for any a;~ a 2
~ -n and j 2 N, where aE
j > ~ aE
j , Fj(a) - Fj(~ a) ¸ F1
j (a) - F 1























However, it turns out that De…nition 2 is implausible within our framework, as
reported in the following remark.
Remark 4 According to De…nition 2, there does not exist any e¢cient F satisfying
EINEE that is more sensitive to di¤erences in e¤ort than the strictly egalitarian
redistributive mechanism.
Proof. By feasibility, for any F di¤erent from strict egalitarianism, there exist
a 2 ~ -n, k 2 N such that Fk(a) < F SE
k (a). Consider ~ a 2 ~ -n, where aE
k > ~ aE
k = ~ aE
i ,
8i 2 N. By EINEE and the fact that F and FSE are e¢cient, we have that F SE
i (~ a)
= Fi(~ a );8i 2 N. Hence, F SE
k (a) - FSE
k (~ a) > Fk(a) - Fk(~ a), and the result follows.
Obviously, any other F should be considered more sensitive to di¤erences in
e¤ort than strict egalitarianism, which is in line with De…nition 1. Hence, we will
only pay attention to De…nition 1 in the rest of the analysis.
Theorem 3 If f is regular, then there does not exist any e¢cient F satisfying EI-
NEE and NNEO that is more sensitive than FMIN to di¤erences in e¤ort (according
to De…nition 1).
Proof. (1) Suppose there exists an F satisfying EINEE and NNEO, where for some
a 2 ~ -n and j;k 2 N, where aE
j > aE
k : Fj(a) - Fk(a) > F MIN
j (a) - F MIN
k (a). By the
assumption of regularity, there exists an l 2 N such that for every e1;e2 2 <, where
e2 > e1, min¢(aT;e2;e1) = f(aT
l ;e2) - f(aT
l ;e1). Hence, by the de…nition of F MIN,
we have that Fj(a) - Fk(a) > f(aT
l ;aE





k : Consider ~ a 2 ~ -n, where ai = ~ ai, 8i 6= l and ~ aE
l = aE
k . By
NNEO, Fi(~ a) ¸ Fi(a), 8i 2 N:
(3) Suppose there exists i 6= l, Fi(~ a) > Fi(a): Then, by (2) and the fact that F
is e¢cient, Fl(~ a) - Fl(a) < f(~ al) - f(al) = min¢(aT;aE
k ;aE
l ): Moreover, by EINEE;
Fl(~ a) = Fk(~ a) ¸ Fk(a). Hence, Fk(a) - Fl(a) < min¢(aT;aE
k ;aE
l ). Hence, if the
16supposition in (3) is correct, then F is not more sensitive to di¤erences in e¤ort
than F MIN:
(4) Suppose Fi(~ a) = Fi(a); 8i 6= l. Then by the assumption in (1), Fj(~ a) - Fk(~ a)
= Fj(~ a) - Fl(~ a) > f(aT
l ,aE




a 2 ~ -n, where
t









j . By NNEO;Fi(
t
a) ¸ Fi(~ a), 8i 2 N. Hence, taking into account that
F is e¢cient, Fl(
t
a) - Fl(~ a) ￿ f(aT
l ;aE
j ) - f(aT
l ;aE
k ) < Fj(~ a) - Fl(~ a). Consequently,
Fl(
t
a) < Fj(~ a) < Fj(
t
a), which violates EINEE: Hence, if F satis…es EINEE, then
the supposition in (4) is not possible. Moreover, taking into account (3), it follows
that neither the supposition in (2) is possible.
(5) Suppose aE
l > aE
k : Consider ~ a 2 ~ -n, where ai = ~ ai, 8i 6= l and ~ aE
l = aE
k : By
NNEO, Fi(~ a) ￿ Fi(a), 8i 2 N: By exactly the same line of reasoning as in (3) and
(4), we can now complete the proof by showing that the supposition in (5) is not
possible.
Hence, if we want to stay within the framework of EINEE and NNEO, there
does not exist a redistributive mechanism that is more sensitive to di¤erences in
e¤ort than F MIN: On the other hand, if we drop either EINEE or NNEO, there are
many options. Of course, if we drop EINEE, the natural reward scheme (where post-
tax and pre-tax incomes are equal) would be one candidate. Moreover, any other
egalitarian-equivalent mechanism than the one being equivalent to F MIN when f is
regular is more sensitive to di¤erences in e¤ort than F MIN. But these mechanisms
violate NNEO.
Theorem 3 does not state that F MIN is more sensitive to di¤erences in e¤ort
than any other F satisfying the conditions of the theorem.8 However, such a result
can be reported if we add the following restriction to our framework.






, 8i;j;k;l 2 N, aE












If f is not additively separable, then EPEE is in direct con‡ict with IM. Hence,
contrary to RC, EPEE should not be considered a minimal condition on any plausi-
ble view of the ethics of responsibility, but rather a condition re‡ecting one possible
interpretation of this idea. EPPE captures the view that the ethics of responsibility
8Actually, I have not been able to come up with any redistributive mechansim F satisfying
EINEE and NDIE that is more sensitive than FMIN to di¤erences in e¤ort. Hence, it might be
the case that Theorem 3 can be strengthened in this respect.
17does not justify the claim that the premium paid for extra e¤ort depends on talent
(which, of course, cannot be justi…ed by the ethics of compensation either), because
talent is not within the control of the agent.
Many redistributive mechanisms satisfy EPEE, among them strict egalitarian-
ism. Within our extended framework, however F MIN is the redistributive mechanism
that is most sensitive to di¤erences in e¤ort.
Theorem 4 If f is regular, then FMIN is more sensitive to di¤erences in e¤ort
(according to De…nition 1) than any other F satisfying EINEE, NNEO, and EPEE.
Proof. (1) Suppose there exists an F satisfying EINEE, NNEO, and EPEE such
that for some a 2 ~ -n and j;k 2 N, where aE
j > aE
k ; Fj(a) - Fk(a) > F MIN
j (a) -
FMIN
k (a). If f is regular, then there exists an l 2 N such that for every e1;e2 2 <,
where e2 > e1, min¢(aT;e2;e1) = f(aT
l ;e2) - f(aT
l ;e1): By the de…nition of F MIN,
Fj(a) - Fk(a) > f(aT
l ;aE
j ) - f(aT
l ;aE
k ):
(2) Consider some ~ a 2 ~ -n, where ~ aE
i = aE
k , 8i 2 N. By EINEE, Fj(~ a)
= Fk(~ a), 8j;k 2 N: Consider some
t










j : By NNEO, Fi(
t









k ). Hence, by NNEO, Fl(
t
















k ). Hence the supposition in (1) is not possible, and the
result follows.
6 Conclusion
It is not straightforward to de…ne the ethics of responsibility in cases where the con-
sequences of changes in factors within our control are partly determined by factors
beyond our control. In this paper, we suggest that one plausible view is to keep us
responsible for the parts of the consequences that are independent of the factors be-
yond our control, and we present and characterise a redistributive mechanism that
satis…es this interpretation of the ethics of responsibility.
Even for the redistributive mechanism outlined in this paper, it will be the case
that some people gain more than others in post-tax income from an increase in
e¤ort. But this will not produce any unjusti…able inequalities, because the premium
18assigned to extra e¤ort will be independent of talent. Hence, everyone gains when
a person with high productivity increases e¤ort, and as a result the inequalities
in post-tax income only re‡ects di¤erences in e¤ort. As remarked by Rawls (1971,
p. 102), the natural distribution of talent is neither just nor unjust, but simply a
natural fact. What is just and unjust is the way institutions deal with these facts.
I suggest that in the case of …rst best taxation, (within a broad class of economic
environments) we can deal with these facts in a way that satis…es both the ethics of
compensation and a plausible version of the ethics of responsibility.
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